On Combat

Alex Kershaw’s The Few: The American “Knights of the Air” Who Risked Everything to Save Britain in the Summer of 1940 is an exciting biographical narrative about three American flyers who left the United States in 1940 to fly against Hitler’s Germany.

The heroic profiles penned by Kershaw paint a vivid picture of the joys of flying a high-performance fighter, the dangers inherent to aviation (two of the three protagonists are killed in non-combatant activities), and the violence of air combat over southern England in the summer of 1940 (the third was killed in battle over France a year after the Battle of Britain as a highly experiecnced combat flier).

Motivation: These three Americans were lured by the love of flying and the the yearning for adventure to slip out of their country and seek combat against the Germans. Altruism and ideology seem to be absent among these men who covertly left their homeland, violated American neutrality laws, and swore allegiance to king George the VI to seek battle. They experience the thrills of the hunt in the air, but the excitement is offset by the ever-present nerve-snapping danger and the grinding fatigue. Excellence in the air is not enough for even the most expert flyers on both sides as highly-experienced combat pilots are lost in crashes or combat over time. Only one of the six Americans who flew for the king in the Battle of Britain survived the war.

Recognition: Small vignettes of German antagonists are welcome offsets to the account of the Americans. Kershaw points out the German fighter pilot’s yearning for fame and decorations (described as “throat ache”–where high decorations are worn) through high kill scores. Curiously the RAF pilots victory tallies are seldom mentioned, nor do they appear in the narrative as motivators. By basing recognition on killing the enemy, the Germans seemingly created a powerful combat incentive, reinforcing Martin Van Creveld’s argument that the Germans created powerful organizational forces to generate combat motivation in Fighting Power. Specifically, honor and recognition went to the most proficient warriors. Incentive system or not, Kershaw’s narrative suggests RAF fighter command was just as eager for battle. The praise and admiration that all of Britain heaped on her fighter pilots during the summer of 1940 (characterized by Churchill’s words: “Never in the field of conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few”) is certain to have been a powerful motivator

Churchill welcomed the American fliers as a political lever, hoping to bring America into the war as the Empire stood alone. America’s reaction to these pilots who slipped out of the country (against American neutrality laws) to fight is largely left unstated, as is FDR’s reaction to these pilots who put him in a difficult political situation. The Few is an exciting read, paints an up close look at the violence and danger of WWII air combat; questions unanswered leaves the reader wishing for more.

Mass reenlistments are a significant affirmation of American fighting men and women’s fighting spirit. On 4 July, 2008, nearly 1% of all American service members in Iraq elected to reenlist in a ceremony committing them to 5,500 man-years of military service. (See Army.mil/news: 1,215 Servicemembers re-up in Iraq). This ceremony more than doubled last year’s Fourth of July reenlistment of 588 in Baghdad’s Al Faw Palace (see: Retention Remains High Military-Wide, Including in Combat Zone)

There are likely to be at least 1,215 different motivations as each individual made the choice to re-up. The benefits of tax-free reenlistment bonuses are certainly a draw, last year the US Army was reported to have paid $1B in bonuses; but ommitment to comrades and unit solidarity are likely to have been significant factors in building up a ceremony on this scale. Commitment to the cause behind the war must certainly have been an element of the decision as most of those re-enlisting are likely to re-deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan during the 4+ year terms they enlisted for.

This week’s testimony of a Marine Lieutenant in a hearing on a shooting in Iraq (”Marine Snipers’ Killing Rules Weren’t Clear, Lieutenant Testifies” Los Angeles Times, 2 July 2008) probes the gray areas between use of force and restraint in a counterinsurgency campaign:

“Lt. Dominic Corabi said that as he and his Marines deployed to Iraq, he tried and failed to get clarification from senior officers about what constitutes “positive identification” and “hostile intent” — terms in the official rules of engagement that dictate when Marines can use deadly force.”

Clear rules are desirable to provide legal and moral protection to US troops of all services, yet no black and white rule set will be sufficient to separate good guys from bad in the inherently ambiguous situations in a counterinsurgency. A sniper’s dilemma is compounded by the nature of the mission…with the ability to kill at long range, snipers have the ability to attack insurgents before they are in range to harm friendlies. Yet the intent of individuals at long range is more difficult to determine than at closer ranges.

The Marine reaction  appears to have been to take the low-level decision out of the hands of the local commander and push it to a higher echelon. It’s not clear, however if the higher authority routinely has better information than the  local commander directly observing the  enemy:

Winnick, 24, a sniper team leader, was on his fourth tour in Iraq when the incident occurred June 17, 2007. Later, Marines changed the rules, requiring even a sniper team leader to get authority from an officer before pulling the trigger, except in cases of self-defense.

There is the potential for higher headquarters to have access to more sources of information: Integration of multiple sources of intelligence is a solution used by Predator UAV crews directed by the Air Operations Center. This integration (listening to communications intelligence, for example) allows for the best chance at determination of hostile intent and identifying known insurgents, and although far from perfect, is likely to produce the most discriminating and precise killing of the enemy.

The US Army is experimenting with new basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) skills based on lessons of recent combat. (see Jackson Testing New Weapons Qualification Method) Building solid habits on the training ranges is an essential step to applying the actions needed in battle. World War II saw a restructuring of marksmanship training (partially instigated by SLA Marshall’s dubious history) replacing bullseyes with person-shaped silhouettes, and pop-up targets to condition soldiers to kill.

New experimental training habits include multi-shot kills to preclude the enemy fighting on after being hit:

“Lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq show that you may have to engage that target more than once before it goes down…This will teach the Soldiers that lesson, versus the regular BRM where with one hit, a target goes down.”

Fighting in and among civilians places a premium on target discrimination, reflected in this experimental BRM training:

During the last three scenarios a new twist is added. A target painted white appears representing a civilian. If a Soldier shoots the civilian, he or she is automatically disqualified.

“It’s teaching the Soldiers to have a little bit of target discrimination,” Burkes said.

“We’ve placed the civilian ‘target’ in the middle of the others,” said Weeks. “The Soldiers have to look beyond it and aim in front and behind.”After the first round of targets, Soldiers rush to the barrier and change magazines, and repeat the scenario three times from behind the barrier — standing, kneeling and prone positions.

Some interesting contrasts have appeared in the week following Sgt Evan Vela’s murder conviction for killing an Iraqi non-combatant captive during a patrol south of Baghdad:

The Washington Times published the Rules of Engagement used by US Army MPs. (see U.S. Military’s Restraint Not Al Qaeda’s War Code) This look at normally classified rules indicate the lines the US military draws between allowed and illicit violence in a combat zone, as indicated by this short segment that seeks to describe one of the bright lines:

“You may use force, up to and including deadly force, against hostile actors in self-defense; in defense of your unit, or other U.S. forces; [and] to prevent the theft, damage or destruction of firearms, ammunition, explosives or property designated by your commander as vital to national security. Protect other property with less than deadly force.

US servicemembers have to apply these rules in complex scenarios every day. Decisions are tinged by fear and uncertainty inherent to a battlefield. This is reflected by Sgt Evan Vela’s “Platoon Commander” [likely platoon sergeant because US platoons are normally led by officers] quoted in the NY Times: G.I. Gets 10-Year Sentence In Killing Of Unarmed Iraqi

Sergeant Vela’s former platoon commander, Sgt. First Class Steven Kipling, said the shooting of Mr. Janabi was a result of Iraq’s violent environment and the often difficult and confusing choices that servicemen make daily. He said that if the actions of every combat serviceman in Iraq were subjected to the same scrutiny as Sergeant Vela’s, “we would have thousands” of cases.

It is easy to sympathize with the difficulties our warriors face, but one must hope that Sgt Kipling was misquoted or taken out of context; Sgt Vela shot and killed a non-combatant captive at close range with a pistol. His actions may have been the safe and easy road for the patrol, but the clearly immoral and illegal nature of his actions runs counter to and undermines the standards reinforced by commanders at every level of the US military.

The Department of Defense released recent Al Qaeda video of Iraqi children being prepared for terror missions. An estimated 250,000 children are being used as soldiers in strife-ridden areas such as Africa. Some of the data collected to date on child soldiers may help better understand this crop of potential child terrorists:

Recruitment Motivation: Forced recruitment is a common (if not the most) common recruitement tactic. Captors may gain compliance with threats against children or their families. Willing volunteers may be found among impoverished or parent-less children seeking protection and support

Combat Motivation (in battle) has been observed to be considerable in African conflicts. Children may be unlikely to foresee the danger they may are in may during combat; immature notions of invulnerability and limited moral thinking can lend itself to fanatic behavior in battle.

Unlike western soldiers, primary group loyalty (to comrades) is less prevalent in some child soldier situations. Loyalty is provided to the paternalistic adult leader, who provides food, support, rewards.

Participation is often ensured with ritualistic violence in which the child recruit plays a part. This step begins an acclimatization towards violence, but it also locks in a child from fear that adult leaders may use violence against them or turn them in as war criminals

Sustaining Motivation, or keeping a child soldier from running away proves problematic, as nearly half eventually escape. Dependency on the leader, incentives, and fear of reprisal (against themselves if caught, or against their families if not) work to keep children in the units.

Engaging Child Units is a lose-lose situation for western forces and governments where soldiers will have to either jeopardize force protection (by not engaging child soldiers) or kill children posing a threat and suffer the images that will hit the world media.

Historian PW Singer suggests when engaging Child Soldiers:

1. Target the leader; if he is the center of gravity, cohesion may evaporate
2. Leave an escape route for the children. This may encourage a child already looking for an escape.

To know the enemy, consider watching minutes 10:00 to 14:00.
DoD Video on Child Terror Training

Sunday 10 Feb, Army Sgt van Vela was sentenced to 10 years in the killing of an Iraqi his patrol had detained. This is an affirmation that the US places a heavy emphasis on the distinction between lawful conduct of war, and the unlawful use of violence against non-combatants.

Just Conduct in War (jus in belo) Reinforced: The rules of engagement used by US troops are the distillation of the laws of armed combat and the just war tradition. Lawful conduct in war (jus in belo) is guided by two moral imperatives: proportionality and discrimination. Discrimination refers to a prohibition on the intentional killing of non-combatants. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants may be a narrow one in a counterinsurgency situation where it is exceedingly difficult to discern an insurgent hiding within the people, but the distinction is a vast moral one. Vela’s patrol violated the principle of discrimination when Vela shot and killed the unarmed Genei Nesir Khudair Al-Janabil in their custody on May 11, 2007.

Sleep Not an Excuse: the shooting took place three days into a patrol, with the snipers getting as few as 3 hours of sleep in 72. Lack of sleep is a constant in a combat zone, the sleep deprivation on this patrol seems extreme, but does not change the fact that a non-combatant in American hands was shot dead. If the patrol made the wrong decision in a clear-cut case (in custody, unarmed), how could they be expected to make the right call in more difficult situations springing from their long-range sniper mission? The team leader must share some of the blame, and was already punished for his part in a cover-up (demotion, 120-day confinement).

Heavy Sentence. Vela’s 10-year sentence is a heavy one, indicating the seriousness of this offense. It tracks with the last two years of US military efforts to stop the deaths of Iraqi civilians. Military justice is appropriately following this emphasis. For the wider trend, see former Marine JAG Gary Solis’ article in the LA Times: Is Military Justice Broken? After Several Bad Cases In Iraq, The System Is Showing Signs That It Works Well.

US Political Fallout is inevitable based on one’s political ideology. Anti-war activists may use the trial to argue that insurgencies are “atrocity-producing” situations; and argue against all war. (see Chris Hedges, A Culture of Atrocity) Hawks are likely to “support the troops” backing whatever measures they need to take to protect themselves as they perform a difficult mission on our behalf; and because of that they deserve our unconditional support.

As difficult as counterinsurgencies are, the practical benefits of discrimination and not harming civilians are substantial in building confidence and winning hearts and minds. The moral benefits are even more important in the long run, because they define us and define the greater good we are fighting to create: freedom, democracy.

Supporting the troops is a great principle, but this support has its limits when a line so clear is crossed; part of our support of the troops has to include sanctions against those who step outside the allowable boundaries. These boundaries have to be vigorously protected, because they will occasionally be crossed. Swift action is then mandated to correct transgressions. Without boundaries, war spirals into gangster violence. –>

Another F-15C was lost 2 Feb off the coast of Hawaii; the cause is yet to be determined, and may prove to be material failure or pilot error–we’ll have to wait on the USAF’s investigation. For the initial report see: Pilot OK after F-15 crash off Hawaii coast

This string of F-15C failures usually leads to political arguments on the utility, necessity, and cost of F-15C replacements. We should be seriously concerned about the capability, confidence, and combat motivation of the pilots asked to fly this aging warbird. Here are three major problem areas that extend beyond the number of aircraft available to fly and fight:

Pilot Proficiency is in the Dumps: F-15C squadrons are fully manned, but have few aircraft to train on. Training has been distrupted by fleet-wide groundings and inspections. Up to a third of the F-15C fleet may have been permanently grounded after last November’s inflight break-up of an F-15 (see: Flaw May Permanently Ground 160 Jets, Air Force General Says). The training that is going on with the reduced F-15 fleet is hobbled by restrictive flight envelopes designed to preserve remaining airframe life and safeguard pilot safety.

Dubious Confidence in the Equipment: Any fighter pilot will be proud to tell you why his or her aircraft is the best in the sky. The inflight failures, speed and G-force limitations undermine confidence in this aircraft. The last thing we want is for an American pilot closing with the enemy wondering if the aircraft will hold together in a fight.

Combat Motivation: Americans should go into battle with the best equipment–knowing you have the best equipment is a powerful combat motivator. Combat in the sky is a winner-take-all proposition; it’s been said there are no points for second place. The F-15C has a marvelous radar and air-to-air missiles. Its airframe fatigue and the resulting aerodynamic limitations are relegating this fighting machine to a third-rate system. The outcome of a limited machine may drive tactics to avoid pitched aerial battles. Planes only able to shoot and run lead us down a slippery slope undermining training, the spirit of attack, and our ability to win in all situations.

Recent Washington Post coverage of Army suicide rates suggest the force is unravelling under the strain of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan:

Suicides among active-duty soldiers in 2007 reached their highest level since the Army began keeping such records in 1980, according to a draft internal study obtained by The Washington Post. Last year, 121 soldiers took their own lives, nearly 20 percent more than in 2006. See Soldier Suicides at Record Level: Increase Linked to Long Wars, Lack of Army Resources by Dana Priest

Undoubtedly the suicide of any person is a sad loss; commanders at all levels devote themselves to the well-being of all their troops. Last year’s statistics from the Congressional Research Service in “American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics” Updated June 29, 2007 indicate a significantly different story when considering all American active duty military: the number and rates of American military self-inflicted deaths, when considered across all services are not at an all time high.

The highest number of Active Duty self-inflicted deaths was 285 in 1988.
The highest rate of Active Duty self-inflicted deaths was 16.6 in 1995.

When the Army releases its service-specific findings, the Army’s top leadership may need to reconsider Army rotation policies, and consider shorter, faster rotations like the other services.

Colonel Charles Hoge of Walter Reed published a study on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in U.S. Soldiers Returning from Iraq in the New England Journal of Medicine this month.

Their major finding was that there is a high correlation between a mild traumatic brain injury (mild TBI) that was severe enough to cause unconsciousness and PTSD, but there was a lower correlation if there was mental confusion without unconsciousness.

43.9% with mild TBI/loss of consciousness met criteria for PTSD
27.3% with mild TBI/altered mental status met criteria for PTSD
9.1% with mild TBI/no injuries met criteria for PTSD

The study doesn’t get us any closer to reconciling the differing perspectives on whether PTSD is caused by organic or psychological mechanisms….One might effectively argue the organic aspect of a concussion resulting in unconsciousness is a severe physical shock to the brain. The opposite argument is likely to be that an event powerful enough to result in unconscousness is likely to be psychologically shocking as well.

Interestingly, Hoge et al, and more prominently, Dr Richard Bryant (in an accompanying editorial, Disentangling Mild Traumatic Brain Injury and Stress Reactions) caution against informing troops of “a postconcussive syndrome” due to the risk of creating a new syndrome,

If troops currently serving in Iraq or Afghanistan are informed about a postconcussive syndrome and persistent problems emerging from mild traumatic brain injury, a new syndrome could arise from the current conflict in which soldiers attribute a range of common stress reactions to the effects of brain injury. This could be damaging to morale and to the person’s future mental health, because it could lead to the expectation of poor recovery. In contrast, the normalization of many of these reactions and the recognition that stress-related conditions can be managed with evidence-based strategies may minimize the unnecessary attribution of common stress reactions to pathology and facilitate resilience after mild traumatic brain injury.