On Combat

Why are civilians attracted to the fight in Iraq and what keeps them there? Motivations are more complex than simply the appeal of money. The Washington Post’s Steve Fainaru’s narrative of four security guards abducted in Iraq provides a small glimpse into the motivation of some of the thousands of armed civilians at war.

Many contractors are former military—all four featured in “For Abducted Guards, Iraq Wasn’t Just About Money” were vets, arguably they knew what they were getting into, but all wanted back some appeals of life in war.

Initial Motivation—what brought them back into the war—appears to have been the enduring appeal of battle catalyzed by the need for change their civilian lives.

Timeless and enduring appeals of battle include intense camaraderie, the intensity of life in a combat zone, and connection to great events beyond a normal life.

Camaraderie: “I’d take a bullet for them” Munns said of [comrades] Cote and Skora. “The rest of these people, I probably wouldn’t.”

Intensity: “I can’t handle monotony,” said Munns, the young former Marine who is also missing. “I gotta have something that shocks my system so I know I’m still alive.”

“Basically I was looking for a feeling that I didn’t have, and this job provided that”

Connection to great events: “There’s only a certain percentage of people who are doing this. It’s like a hidden, secret part of the war, and if I could be part of that hidden, secret thing, it would be cool, you know? It’s kind of like being part of history. People are gonna be like, ‘Oh, man, remember the war? Where were you?’ I was here. I was here.”

These appeals of battle, however, seem to have been catalyzed by a dramatic need for change in ordinary civilian lives, either an urgent need for money and/or the need to change direction after a major setback. Two of the contractors applied for security jobs after DUIs, both with pressing financial needs: one (Cote) to pay for college, one (Reuben) to pay the bills of a family of teenagers after losing a police job.

“It basically gave me an opportunity to run away from my problems,” he said. “So I just left.”

Sustaining Motivation—what kept these men in the fight—differed from the initial motivation as the imagined war proved to be different from the real one they encountered:

The work was harder and more dangerous than expected: “Reuben said he was exhausted from having worked ‘72 or 73 days straight’ and jittery from fending off constant attacks….‘The RPG attacks were the scariest thing I’ve ever seen’”

Pain and death of war was intimately close: “he was increasingly repulsed by what he saw on Iraq’s dangerous roads. The coffin [of an Iraqi co-worker being returned to a family] had a drip valve that was positioned directly over the windshield. Water and blood trickled over the glass…the screams from his family. It rips your heart out.”

The men wrestled with their situation, whether to continue on or go.

“Reuben went back and forth about whether to stay on. He weighed the risk and time away from his family against the cash, which never seemed to be enough, and the appeal of the warrior lifestyle.”

Although the possibility of being killed and mutilated (as had the Blackwater employees who were killed and burned precipitating the battle of Fallujah in 2004) was not far from consideration:

“It’s not the getting hit part that bothers me,” he said. “It’s the getting lost and getting hung from a bridge part.”

There is a sense that there was little time and opportunity to consider the personal risk vs reward of combat, and close calls were apparently not enough of a catalyst for some:

“Young had decided to keep returning to Iraq, even after a bullet took a chunk out of the collar of his armored vest and threw him into the steering wheel as he escorted a convoy through Baghdad one afternoon.”

“There’s no time to think about yourself. Sometimes you should take a step back and take it all in and be like, ‘What am I really here for? Why am I really doing this? Is it really worth it?’ You go out, you get hit and come back, you go out and get hit and come back. You just become numb, and you just do it.”

And seemingly, the money was never quite enough to return home:

“I’m getting caught up on some bills and stuff like that. And I heard they’re coming out with that new Dodge Challenger in 2008. I want that.”

“All you’re thinking about is the money….You have $50,000 in the bank, and all you’re thinking about is, ‘Another month and I’ll have $57,000, another month and I’ll have $64,000….I hate to say it, but I am so thankful for this war,” he said. “I only came over here for the money, and I didn’t even know I could do this job until two years ago. I didn’t know it was available to me.” From: “Private War : Convoy to Darkness Cutting Costs, Bending Rules, And a Trail of Broken Lives”

Interestingly, the cause and ideology behind the war goes unmentioned in the words of the contractors or in the telling by Steve Fainaru.

Regardless of their individual motivations, these men responded to the needs of our government and our military. They risk their lives to fulfill a mission we do not have enough uniformed forces to accomplish.

Our hearts must go out to them, we must keep them in our prayers and we must keep their families in our prayers as they cope with the impossible uncertainty and fear. At the same time, the MNF-I must do everything in its power to reclaim the freedom of these individuals who put themselves in harms way at our request.

This week combat commanders rejected a recommendation by Army psychiatric community to control operational stress through frequent in theater rotations. (See USA Today 19 June 2007: “Troop’s 1-Month Break Blocked“) The specific recommendation was for units to rotate out of the line for one month out of every four. The benefits would include maintenance of unit cohesion and the opportunity for solders to decompress as units, which is vastly superior to decompression as individuals. In theory this approach would focus on combat troops—those spending their days outside the wire and needing decompression opportunities the most (but benefiting from current in-theater R+R the least according to the latest report in Mental Health Assessment Team report IV–MHAT IV).

Realities of ground combat in Iraq

The recommendation was an apparent non-starter due to the troop requirements of the current ground strategy. With US ground forces doing the bulk of the fighting and holding for the foreseeable future (see Washington Post, 26 June 2007 General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency), there aren’t enough grunts in all of America’s armed services combined to do the job in Iraq. Even with the surge, twenty combat brigades are doing a job that requires somewhere on the order of one hundred combat brigades. When one is desperately short, how can a commander pull out 25% of the strength of each unit for in theater rotations? On the other hand, if troop levels will never reach the real requirement of this strategy, how can US commanders not afford to make a decision to sustain the combat capability of the personnel (and ultimately, units) we have now? Intentionally “eating our seed corn” by psychologically burning out our forces is a significant strategic risk—hopefully the probability of success in this surge justifies the risk.

Better Case Needed by the Medics

One step the Army medical community can do to strengthen its recommendation is to better articulate and substantiate the requirement for rotation. Although many have a gut feel that R+R is necessary to combat operation stress, MHAT IV does little to make the case. How much rotation out of line will reduce residual stress levels? How long? Does rotation into the sanctuary of the forward operation base (FOB) serve the same purpose? (note: our sanctuaries seem to becoming less safe, see this month’s Miami Herald’s: Green Zone Targeted Again) Unfortunately MHAT IV doesn’t provide any data on these questions, and it actually undermines its case by indicating residual stress doesn’t reset even after a year’s rotation back to the US (see American Soldier’s Finite Well of Courage).

Last month’s publication of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) mental health assessment indicates a long-term problem for American warriors: repeat deployments are drawing from a finite well of courage, and the well isn’t re-filling between deployments.

Last month the Army Surgeon General’s office posted its fourth OIF Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT) report dated November 2006. This brave step opens a window on the mental health of soldiers on repeat combat deployments. The report finds that mental health problems are directly related to intensity and duration of heavy combat (time “outside the wire” in Iraq)–those engaged in high intensity combat are more than twice as likely to encounter anxiety and depression than those encountering light combat, and are nearly four times as likely to encounter acute stress (PTSD symptoms) than those exposed to light combat.

This probably isn’t shocking news to most, the major revelation in the report is that repeat deployers are one and a half times more likely to screen for acute stress than first-time deployers. This indicates that there is residual stress that is not going away in the time back home between deployments (median time deployed was 9 months out of 3 years median service in MHAT IV soldiers surveyed).

Lord Moran, British a battalion surgeon in WWI, introduced the notion of a finite well of courage in the heart of each warrior: “in the trenches a man’s will power was his capital and he was always spending…When their capital was done, they were finished.” To many, Moran sounds anachronistic; today’s soldiers backed by modern science and medicine could certainly do better than the doughboys in the trenches.

Modern evidence from MHAT IV suggest Moran may have been right–a harsh reality for a small volunteer military facing a prolonged fight on the ground. With a conscript military (as we had in Vietnam), short enlistments precluded multiple combat deployments; soldiers did their duty and were released as new soldiers were drafted as replacements.

Commanders at all levels are loath to return to a draftee force with its inherent motivation, training, and professionalism problems, but this preference does not lessen the fact that we either have the wrong strategy for the military we have, or we have the wrong military for the strategy we have.

Navy Seal Marcus Luttrell’s SEAL team was discovered and engaged by a large Taliban force in Kunar Province, January 2005. Luttrell’s team killed 35 Taliban, but all three of Luttrell’s teammates died in the firefight and Luttrell was seriously wounded. As Luttrell hung onto life, a group of Afghans found him, cared for him, and ultimately protected him from Taliban until his rescue.

Laura Blumenfeld of the Washington Post well-describes many human dimensions of modern combat in her account: “The Sole Survivor: A Navy Seal, Injured and Alone, Was Saved By Afghans’ Embrace and Comrades’ Valor” 11 June 2007.

Motivated by the desire to avenge the victims of 911 (“He had kept a magazine photograph of a World Trade Center victim in his pants pocket”), Luttrell’s team faced a classic moral dilemma when they captured non-combatants near an enemy held-village. They discussed whether to kill the civilians to ensure stealth and mission accomplishment, or to release them and risk discovery. Luttrell cast the team’s deciding vote to spare the civilians.

American warriors have faced this situation before—at least two special forces detachments in Desert Storm faced this same choice (both elected to let the civilians go, but later faced tough battles fighting their way out). Luttrell’s decision, and those from previous wars, match the conclusions of countless ethics discussions in officer training courses. Typical discussion points: “American soldiers don’t kill civilians…Americans must fight by the rules…just war mandates ‘discrimination,’ i.e. no targeting of civilians ….We have no alternative but to occupy the moral high ground…we have to do the right thing…” All are great–sounding guidelines in an academic setting, but what was the cost on the ground? Doing the right thing in Afghanistan ultimately cost the lives of three teammates and sixteen members of a rescue force. A staggering cost to consider back in the classroom discussions.

Luttrell did the right thing, which was the only correct choice, but will be haunted by his decision for the rest of his life. His bad “moral luck” thrust him into a problem with all bad alternatives. Our hearts are heavy and must pour out to the families of the warriors lost. We must ultimately affirm Luttrell’s courageous decision.

There may be no greater emotional shock in combat than the violent death of a comrade. Survivor’s guilt, rage, or thirst for revenge are very strong emotions that naturally spring from the heart of any human being. These emotions are amplified by adrenaline and arousal inherent to highly stressful situations. Some of these emotions may be beyond the individual on the spot’s ability to control.

It is clearly the commander’s responsibility to control adverse human reactions to the extraordinary stress of battle. These points are explicitly made in the Joint manual on counterinsurgency FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: “leadership positions must provide the moral compass for their subordinates as they navigate this complex environment” … “Caring leaders recognize these pressures and provide emotional ‘shock absorbers’ for their subordinates”

Hearings being conducted at Camp Pendelton on the Haditha killings suggest a trap posed by the increasingly networked battlefield we are creating. The Marine battalion commander did not respond to the killings, and instead watched video feeds from his command post, seven miles away.

“From a command post about seven miles from Haditha, he viewed insurgent movements via video from an aerial drone and directed several attacks and counterattacks by marines against insurgents in residential areas around the city, according to testimony this week. Colonel Chessani visited one battle site later that day, but did not inspect the homes where 19 of the 24 civilians were killed by grenades and rifle fire.” See “At Haditha Hearing, Dueling Views Of A Battalion Commander” New York Times, 8 June 2007.

Chessani may have been tired, he may have trusted his subordinates too much, he may have lacked a security detail to reach the site of the ambush, or perhaps he may have been content to lead his troops indirectly through a TV screen. Increasing sensor feeds, connectivity, remote communications characterize the network-centric future of warfare. Can remote feeds substitute for looking into a subordinates eyes or replace the calming effect of a cool-headed commander arriving at the scene? Apparently not in the case at Haditha in 2005.

What strategists should know about “human constants” in war:

• Wars place warriors into harm’s way with a mandate from society to use force against other men and women in pursuit of society’s objectives.
• The inevitable exposure to danger and the interplay of opposing forces give rise to a range of emotions including fear, doubt, anger, rage, and grief. These emotions inhibit clear thinking and rationality in the warrior’s actions
• The calibration of violence in war is fraught with inevitable problems due to play of emotions, incomplete information, and varied human reactions to the concentration of immense destructive power in the hands of individuals
• Effective performance in an environment of danger requires physical, emotional, moral preparation. Physical, emotional, or moral failings on the part of a commander can jeopardize the performance of many subordinates
• Exposure to danger and death erodes the warrior’s character, imposing a psychological toll on the warrior and society

Therefore:

This is why strategy is an art, as well as science

Why do citizens enlist during war? Israeli military psychiatrist Reuven Gal identified four primary reasons for serving in the IDF: for survival when facing an existential threat, for ideological reasons, for normative reasons (expectations of others), and for personal reasons (education, other benefits).

Two articles this week (“War’s Chosen High School” and “Think Your Back Hurts? Imagine Boot Camp at 42”) provide an anecdotal glimpse on two generations of Americans now enlisting together: [Read more →]

A recent article in the Los Angeles Times, “Chopper Pilot Heads Back To A Riskier Iraq” by Richard Fausset (3/27/07), illuminated some difficulties in sustaining combat motivation in the face of repeat deployments. Initial passions are eroded over time by dangers, losses, the environment, and thoughts for family. Warriors with families face have to reconcile conflicting obligations to the cause, the band of brothers, and their family.

Major points illuminate this conflict for a 3^rd ID aviator facing his third deployment to Iraq: [Read more →]

The military hospital in Elmendorf Alaska has got the right idea to help heal it’s wounded warriors: cultivating a sense of community as a healing force.

The Medical Group Commander is hawking the medical system and pulling wounded Alaskan warriors back home to heal (see “Injured Alaska Troops Embraced By Hometown Healing” in the Anchorage Daily News March 19, 2007): [Read more →]

How can Iraqis carry out this killing within previously peaceful neighborhoods? NPRs’ Ann Garrels recent trip to Iraq shed some light on growing sectarian violence. In her 10/10/06 report “Violence Forces Iraqis to Seek New Homes” there are several enablers of violence in action apparent.

The setting: Sectarian militias and criminals are forcing different sects out of Iraq neighborhoods. A Sunni man is killed by members of the Shia Mahdi Army as he packs his furniture into a van while leaving Houria, a mixed Baghdad neighborhood. There are several enablers evident in theradio program: [Read more →]